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"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the time I accepted the invitation to participate in this symposium, the
subprime mortgage crisis has exploded into a systemic financial crisis. Analysts
and pundits alike seem on a quest to outdo each other in using dramatic phrases
to describe the mortgage crisis's historic proportions. The causes of a crisis so
large must have a multiplicity of causes lying in the realms of bank regulation
and supervision, the operation and regulation of the securitization market, and
the derivatives and insurance markets. Yet, the root and spark of the various
financial reverberations initiated in the home mortgage finance market. My
presentation will focus on this central cause to look for an explanation of what
went wrong. In a general sense, Saint Thomas Aquinas predicted the systemic
freezing of the financial system, which we are currently witnessing, when he
predicted that in a society where unjust exchange transactions dominate,
* Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. B.A., Yale University;
M.A., Kings College University of London: and J.D., University of Pennsylvania. I would like to
thank the South Carolina Law Review for hosting the symposium at which this article was
presented as well as Gregory R. Mulkey for his invaluable research assistance.
1. 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON; OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS
284 (Dover 1980) (1905) (emphasis added).
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eventually all exchanges will cease. 2 1 will argue that a major reason for this
financial winter we are witnessing is that the market for buying housing has
been systemically violating core principles of justice. Although other factors
certainly contributed to its breadth and expansion, unjust financial transactions
are the root of the problem.
For some time now, at various levels of American society, people have
been recognizing a problem with our system of financing home ownership. This
very symposium confirms that. Members of Congress have introduced bills
proposing that bankruptcy judges be empowered to revise mortgage loans.
3
Prominent academics are proposing new regulation of the mortgage market.
4
But amid this activity, there lacks a comprehensive normative measure for
evaluating the system as a whole. This deficiency does not necessarily mean
that all of the proposed reforms lack merit. Yet, the ongoing discussions are in
need of an articulation of a normative yardstick with which to evaluate these
proposals as well as the system they attempt to reform. We need to ask more
fundamental questions than whether regulations should require a few more
items of disclosure. Is it just for someone to make a profit from lending a
homebuyer the money to buy necessary shelter? How do we even begin to
evaluate the justice of such a system?
This Article looks to history for answers. It turns to the natural law
economic philosophy of Aristotle as developed by the scholastics. Building on
certain Roman law concepts, scholastic writers developed two key economic
theories to evaluate the justice or injustice of voluntary transactions-usury
theory5 and just price theory.6 This Article does not attempt to argue definitively
for the correctness of these theories in all their applications. Instead, the Article
demonstrates what judgments these theories allow us to form about the essence
of the current housing finance system. After presenting the aspects of these
2. 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, lect. IX,
at 423 (C.I. Litzinger trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1964) (c. 1271) [hereinafter AQUINAS,
COMMENTARY] (arguing that without just exchange, no exchange will happen and that exchange is
needed for society).
3. See H.R. 3778, 1 10th Cong. § 2 (2007); S. 2133, 1 10th Cong. § 2 (2007); H.R. 3609,
11 0th Cong. § 2 (2007). After months of political wrangling and lobbying, this concept did not
survive in the housing legislation passed by Congress. See Lori Montgomery, Senate Approves
Housing Package, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2008, at DI. However, some consumer groups are still
advocating the idea of allowing bankruptcy modification of home mortgages. See Pam Dawkins,
As Banking Chairman, Dodd Concentrates on Solutions to Subprime Woes, ADVOCATE (Stamford,
Conn.), Apr. 24, 2008, at 1.
4. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
98-100 (2008) (proposing the creation ofthe "Financial Product Safety Commission").
5. See infra Part Ill.
6. See infra Part IV.
[VOL. 60: 707
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theories that are relevant to the acquisition of housing, the Article views the
residential mortgage system through the lens they provide.
Part 11 presents a brief overview of some factual economic data about the
home mortgage market with an emphasis on the subprime sector. Part III
presents the essence of the scholastic usury theory as it relates to consumer
credit. Part IV examines essential elements of the just price theory and in
particular its application to credit sales. Part V suggests some normative
evaluation of the mortgage system described in Part II from the perspective of
these theories. Finally, Part VI proposes some tentative conclusions.
II. THE MORTGAGE MARKET AND THE SUBPRIME CRISIS
A home mortgage is a financial transaction whereby a person borrows
funds from a bank or other financial institution that the person uses to finance
the purchase of a residence.7 The borrower usually repays the amount borrowed
over time on an amortization schedule which allows for constant monthly
payment amounts. 8 The borrower grants a mortgage on the property guarantying
repayment of principal plus interest.9 Usually, the lender charges fees at the
origination of the loan to cover costs of origination. 
10
Subprime mortga es are generally described as loans to borrowers with
credit impairments. Common credit impairments include a Fair Isaac
Corporation (FICO) credit score below 620, a lack of credit history, or a high
debt-to-income ratio. 12 Borrowers with these credit impairments have an
increased risk of default, so they generally do not qualify for a prime
mortgage. 13 Many popular types of subprime mortgages give the borrower a low
interest rate at origination that continues for the first two or three years, and
then the rate resets to an adjustable rate, consisting of an index rate plus a
margin percentage.' 4 The reset rate can increase the borrower's interest rate by
as much as five percentage points. 15
7. See JOSEPH R. BAGBY, INST. FOR BUS. PLANNING, REAL ESTATE FINANCING DESK
BOOK 24 (1975).
8. See id. at 28.
9. See id. at 24.
10. See id. at 31.
11. See FREDERICK T. FURLONG & JOHN KRAINER, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F., THE
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET: NATIONAL AND TWELFTH DISTRICT DEVELOPMENTS 6 (2008),
available at http://www.frbst org/publications/federalreserve/annual/2007/2007annualreport.pdt
12. Edward J. Kirk, The "Subprime Mortgage Crisis": An Overview of the Crisis and
Potential Exposure, RLI EXECUTIVE PRODUCTS GROUP, Sep. 2007, at 1, http://www.rli-
epg.com/articles/Subprime-Mortgage-Crisis.pdf
13. See id. at 1-2.
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This class of mortgage is also characterized by interest rates that are higher
than prime mortgage interest rates. 16 Upon origination, the interest rates of a
subprime mortgage are on average 2% higher than prime mortgage interest
rates.' 7 From 1995 to 1998, the subprime origination interest rates were between
9% and 10%.18 Between 1999 and 2000, subprime interest rates rose to around
11%. 19 After peaking in 2000, they started to decline, leveling off at around
7.5% in 2004.
From 1994 to 2005, the aggregate amount of all subprime mortgage
originations grew from $35 billion to $665 billion. 21 In 1994 the subprime
mortgage market comprised less than 5% of the overall mortgage market.22 As
of 2006, the subprime mortgage market made up 23% of the total mortgage
market.
23
Several theories exist that try to explain the current crisis in the mortgage
market. Most of the theories contain two common variables: the common
structure of subprime mortgages and declining home prices. 24 While home
prices continued to rise, borrowers were able to sell or refinance their homes
before the lower origination rates became adjustable. 25 When home prices
started to decrease in 2007, borrowers were unable to sell or refinance their
homes before the teaser rates expired and their interest rate substantially
increased. 26 As a result of the decreased home prices and resetting interest rates,
many borrowers defaulted on their loans and were forced into foreclosure.
27
16. See Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the






21. ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND:
FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST To HOMEOWNERS 7 (2006),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/FC-paper-1 2-19-new-cover-I .pdf
22. See id. & fig.].
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Bair, supra note 14 (describing how the two variables impact a fixed rate
theory); Kirk, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing industry trends and economic and financial factors
that "combined to create the current crisis").
25. Bair, supra note 14.
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111. THE SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF USURY
In my recent article 28 1 present a detailed history of the scholastic theory of
usury and its development, refinement, and eventual distortion. For purposes of
the present discussion, I will present only a summary of the main principles of
what I call the objectivist approach to usury theory.
The scholastic theory is rooted in a fundamental distinction between
investing capital in a business or wealth-producing assets and lending money to
fund consumption.29 As the classical economist Henry Somerville explained:
Now the Canonists never quarrelled with payments for the use of
capital, they raised no objection to true profit, the reward of risk, ability
and enterprise, but they disputed the identification of the lending of
money with the investment of capital and denied the justice of interest
as a reward for saving without investment.
The Canonist principle was that sharing in trade risks made an
investor a partner, a co-owner of capital, not simply a money-lender,
and gave a title to profit.
30
According to the natural law theory of usury, someone who lends money
for the purpose of consumption, as opposed to investment in a business venture,
should be entitled merely to compensation for loss incurred in making the loan
("interest" in the original Roman law meaning of the word).3' The charging of
"usury" in the scholastic sense (and used in this Article as distinguished from
modern usury statutes) is the exaction of the payment of a gain above
compensation for loss. The charging of usury is impermissible.
33
The two main arguments supporting this prohibition on charging a profit on
money loans have roots in notions of commutative and distributive justice.
28. Brian M. McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and the Lost Theory
of Usury, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 549 (2008).
29. See, e.g., Peter John Olivi, On Usury and Credit, in 4 READINGS IN WESTERN
CIVILIZATION: MEDIEVAL EUROPE 318 (Julius Kirshner & Karl F. Morrison eds., 1986)
(distinguishing between handing over money to someone "to be spent on his own personal needs"
and to an "average merchant engaged in legitimate enterprise").
30. Henry Somerville, Interest and Usury in a New Light, 41 ECON. J. 646, 648 (1931).
31. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 105-06 (1957).
32. Pope Benedict XIV, Vix Pervenit, 3.1-11 (Nov. 1, 1745), available at
http://www.ewtn.com/library/ENCYC/B14VIXPE.htm ("The nature of... usury has its proper
place and origin in a loan contract. This financial contract between consenting parties demands, by
its very nature, that one return to another only as much as he has received.... [A]ny gain which
exceeds the amount [the lender] gave is illicit and usurious.").
33. See McCall, supra note 28, at 550.
2009]
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Charging more than the amount loaned (plus compensation for loss) is a
violation of commutative justice, which requires equality in voluntary exchange
transactions.34 Aristotle argued that commutative justice reuired equality in all
exchange transactions between individuals in society. Aristotle was not
unconcerned with the distribution of wealth among people, 36 but the principle of
equality in exchange held that particular transactions between individuals-
voluntary or involuntary-were not a principled method to achieve
redistribution. James Gordley has explained that equality in exchange is not
meant to achieve a just distribution of wealth-the achievement of which
involves principles of distributive, not commutative, justice-but is meant to
"avoid random redistributions" of wealth through "the system of exchange."37
To charge a profit in addition to the return of money lent plus compensation for
loss is an unjust exchange. 38 The lender charges both for the money itself (in
requiring the return of the money) and for its use (the usury charged). To charge
for the use of something which is consumed in use is to charge twice for the
same thing. As Aquinas explains:
34. See Jaques Melitz, Some Further Reassessment of the Scholastic Doctrine of Usury, 24
KYKLOS 473, 476 (1971) ("[T]he usury doctrine, dating mainly to 1150-1350, appeals not to
authority and charity, but to 'natural law', therefore to reason and commutative justice."). Two
quotations from Saint Thomas Aquinas can serve as a definition of commutative justice: "In the
first place there is the order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private
individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the
mutual dealings between two persons." 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. Il-Il, Q.
61, art. 1, at 1452 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947)
(1265-74) [hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. Further,
[I]n commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his
that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of
commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so
that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer
out ofthat which belonged to the other.
Id. art. 2, at 1453.
35. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. E, ch. 7, 1131b25-1132a25, at 84-85
(Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., D. Reidel 1975) (350 B.C.).
36. See id., ch. 5, 1130b30-33, at 82, ch.9, 1134a]-4, at 89 (stating that justice involves
both equality in individual exchange and a proportionate (not necessarily equal) distribution of
wealth among all in society).
37. James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1616 (1981). This equality
in exchange does not mean that one party cannot use the thing received in exchange to make a
profit, but this is not a gain from the exchange itself
38. See NOONAN, supra note 31, at 106-07 ("Interest is never thought of as payment on a
loan; it is the 'difference' to be made up to a party injured by the failure of another to execute his
obligations. The common distinction between usura and interessee, id est non lucrum, sed vitatio
damni. Interest is purely compensatory. It is accidentally and extrinsically associated with a
loan .... The early recognition of interest is thus strictly limited to individual cases where the
writers have seen that the lender has actually suffered damage." (quoting St. Raymond of
Pennaforte, Summa casuum conscientiae, 2:7:2 (Verona, 1744) (c. 1236))).
6
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To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell
what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is
contrary to justice.
In order to make this evident, we must observe that there are
certain things the use of which consists in their consumption: thus we
consume wine when we use it for drink, and we consume wheat when
we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing
must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is
granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself; and for this
reason, to lend things of this kind is to transfer the ownership.
Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the
wine, he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling
what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of
injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or
wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in
equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.
In addition to violating principles of commutative justice, the charging of
usury involves undesirable redistributions of wealth contrary to distributive• 40 ..
justice. Allowing the charging of usury for a consumptive loan establishes a
principle of distribution based on surplus and need. 41 Those in need, the
borrowers, redistribute their future wealth to those with excess wealth, the
lenders. This system requires a redistribution of wealth (in the form of the usury
paid) from those with more need to those with less. Scholastic usury theory
challenges such a principle of redistribution.
Saint Bernardine of Sienna, in refuting the claim that despite such harmful
redistributive effects some people need to borrow at usury, explained how no
person needs to borrow at usury because it only makes the needy worse off.
42
Defenders of the usurers suggested that the really needy poor and those who
need money for a short time due to a temporary emergency, such as illness or
crop failure, benefit from borrowing at usury.4 3 Saint Bernardine responded that
the first group, the needy poor, require social charity, or in modern language,
public assistance.4 4 If they were really needy, they could not afford to pay the
39. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 78, art. 1, at 1518.
40. Aquinas also provides a definition of distributive justice: "[T]here is the order of the
whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order ofthat which belongs to the community in
relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes
common goods proportionately." Id. Q. 61, art. 1, at 1452.
41. See NOONAN, supra note 31, at 73-74.
42. See id.
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cost of the goods and services they require plus the additional amount of
usury.4 5 The payment of usury only exacerbates their poverty by transferring
what little future wealth they may earn to the usurer. The second group, the
temporarily needy, is similar. They become gradually impoverished and the
usurer, taking advantage of their temporary need, transfers wealth from the
needy to the wealthy. This group would be better off liquidating assets,
foregoing consumption, or having recourse to public assistance.4 8 Those who
borrow at usury for needed consumption (i.e., food and shelter) are transferring
what little wealth they have to those wealthier than themselves. This is an unjust
redistribution, as it takes from those in need and enriches those with excess
wealth. This is inherent in usury: one who is not in need of the money lent
would not pay usuries to acquire it and would instead use existing wealth.
Beyond the wealth transfers from the very poor to the wealthy, a credit system
based on usury eventually demotes those in a moderate socioeconomic sphere to
a lower one.4 9 In addition to making the very poor even less wealthy, borrowing
at usury to maintain consumption needs also reduces the middle class to a lower50
state, or even poverty. Because usury involves paying more than the value of
money received, it always involves a wealth transfer to the usurer. In this vein,
Ben Jonson once quipped that usurers were "base rogues that undo young
gentlemen.' Not only does usury make the poor poorer, but also the number of
the poor increases over time as the numbers of the moderately wealthy decline.
Pope Innocent IV argued that redistribution of wealth on this principle is
harmful for society as a whole. Usury results in individual and societal decline
of wealth.52 The borrower at usury transfers a portion of his future wealth to the
usurer.5 3 The society suffers as usury diverts investment away from productive
activities, such as farming, because the wealthy invest their money in usurious
54loans where the money is put to nonproductive uses.
Thus, the scholastic theory of credit considers lending money for the
purchase of nonproductive assets to be subject to a different set of legal norms
than investment in businesses and productive assets (which this Article does not





49. See NORMAN JONES, GOD AND THE MONEYLENDERS: USURY AND LAW IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND 45 (1989).
50. See id.
5 1. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA APPARATUS IN V LIBROS DECRETALIUM, V:19, De
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better position for having made the loans (i.e., paying a gain or usury) is unjust.
It violates commutative justice by requiring borrowers to repay more than they
received. Also, it produces wealth redistribution from those in need to those
with surplus. Finally, usurious lending for consumption diverts wealth from
productive investments. The theory rejects a financial system premised upon the
notion that borrowing at usury is a just method for people to obtain the things
they require to sustain life.
The prohibition of the payment of usury does not mean that a lender cannot
require compensation for loss. A lender may legitimately ask its borrower to
indemnify it for costs associated with making the loan: travel costs to obtain the
money to lend, accounting costs, or expenses incurred to comply with the legal
55formalities of making a loan. A lender may also require compensation for a
borrower's failure to return the money when promised as long as the delay is
56real and the compensation is moderate and reasonable. This concept of
compensation for loss lies at the origin of the word interest. In Roman law, the
term quod interest referred to "that which is the difference" or loss• 57
occasioned. Interest, in its original sense, is never payment for the use of
money; it represents the difference a borrower must make up to a lender injured
by making a loan or the amount a delinquent borrower must pay to a lender for
58failing to honor its obligations. Roman law made a distinction between usura
and interessee: "id est non lucrum, sed vitatio damni." 59 This fundamentally
different understanding of interest from the modern use of the term is what led
one English writer to exclaim: "Usury and trewe interest be things as contrary
as falshod is to truth." 
60
Thus, the scholastic theory allows a consumer lender to charge for costs and
losses incurred in making the loan, but the lender may not charge an amount in
excess of actual or reasonably estimated future loss. Lest one argue that such a
system is impossible to implement, the Italian institution of the mons pietatis
(which survives to this day in Mexico as the Mexican Bank of Pity)6 1 is proof of
the practical application of these principles. In general, this institution provided
55. BERNARD W. DEMPSEY, INTEREST AND USURY 173 (1948).
56. See id. at 175; see also NOONAN, supra note 31, at 107-09 ("The need to have a check
upon a contumacious debtor was recognized by the canonists, though the canon law was silent on
the question.").
57. See NOONAN, supra note 31, at 106.
58. See id.
59. St. Raymond of Pennaforte, Summa casuum conscientiae, 2:7:2, quoted in NOONAN,
supra note 31, at 106. This author translates the phrase as, "it is not monetary gain but the
avoidance of financial loss."
60. Constant J. Mews & Ibrahim Abraham, Usury and Just Compensation: Religious and
Financial Ethics in Historical Perspective, 72 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 2 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
61. See McCall, supra note 28, at 595 n.235.
2009]
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loans to those in need who had an item of property to pledge. 62 The bank was
permitted to charge borrowers a fee to cover its costs of operation and no
63more.
Thus, the objectivist approach to scholastic usury theory maintains a
fundamental legal and moral difference between investment of capital in
business and lending money to obtain items for personal consumption. As to the
latter, it is unjust to require the return of more money than lent as this is an
unjust exchange. A lender who suffers a loss occasioned by the transaction itself
or the borrower's breach of duty can require equalization of this loss in the
payment of interest. To ask more than this constitutes an unjust transfer of
wealth.
IV. THE JUST PRICE THEORY AND CREDIT SALES
The second major aspect of scholastic natural law theory that provides a
useful framework for evaluating the mortgage finance crisis is the just price
theory. As with usury, the just price theory has roots in commutative justice. As
early as Aristotle, philosophers recognized the necessity of the exchange of
goods. A house builder needs shoes and a shoemaker needs a house. 64 As the
exchange should be mutually beneficial to each party-each needs what the
other is to exchange-one party should not bear a disproportionate share of the
costs. 65 If unequal exchanges were to occur, they would serve as random
instances of wealth redistribution; if wealth is to be redistributed, a normative
scheme not dependent upon individual transactions should do the
redistribution.66
An apparent contradiction existed in the philosophy of Aristotle (as well as
Plato). Although recognizing the need for the exchange of goods as necessary to
society, Aristotle was skeptical of tradesmen-those engaged in retailS67
exchange-and banned them from his ideal community. The just price theory
62. See id. at 593.
63. See id. at 595 (citing CAROL BRESNAHAN MENNING, CHARITY AND STATE IN LATE
RENAISSANCE ITALY: THE MONTE DI PIETA OF FLORENCE 60-61 (1993)).
64. See AQUINAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 2, lect. VIII, at 421; ARISTOTLE, supra note
35, ch. 8, at 1133a7-26, at 87.
65. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 77, art. 1, at 1513 ("Now whatever
is established for the common advantage, should not be more of a burden to one party than to
another ... ).
66. See Gordley, supra note 37, at 1591.
67. DIANA WOOD, MEDIEVAL ECONOMIC THOUGHT 111 (2002) (citing THE POLITICS OF
ARISTOTLE bk. VII, ch. IX, 1328b, at 353 (Ernest Barker trans., Clarendon Press 1948) (c. 335-22
B.C.)); see also THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra, bk. 1, ch. VIII, 1256a-b, 1257a-b, at 22-32
("We can thus see that retail trade [which buys from others to sell at a profit] is not naturally a part
of the art of acquisition. If that were the case, it would only be necessary to practice exchange to
[VOL. 60: 707
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can be seen as a reconciliation of the apparently contradictory acceptance of
exchange transactions but wariness of those who facilitate them. Aristotle
argued that exchange is necessary for society but exchange is not possible. . .68
unless equality is maintained in an exchange. It was those tradesmen who sold
in violation of the just price theory who were to be restrained and whose actions
gave rise to the skepticism.
Based on Aristotelian theories of justice as the mean, advocates of the just
price theory assert that voluntary exchanges need to be proportional in value.69
No person should profit from another's loss. Regarding exchanges, justice is
found in an equal exchange, but injustice is found in an unequal one because the
mean is not maintained. Yet, equality does not require that identical items be
exchanged; this would defeat the idea of exchange. A proportionality of value
needs to be maintained. So if a shoemaker were to exchange with a
homebuilder, the shoemaker would not exchange one shoe for one house but
'71rather the number of shoes that equate to the value of the house. Since a
homebuilder will not necessarily need so many shoes, money was invented to.... '72
serve as a method for achieving this proportion. With the invention of money,
parties can express value in prices quantified in a standardized manner. Thus, a
just price is a price that equals the value of the thing being purchased.7
the extent that sufficed for the needs of both parties [and not to the extent of the making of profit
by one ofthe parties at the expense ofthe other].").
68. See AQUINAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 2; ARISTOTLE, supra note 35, ch. 8, 1133a21-
25, at 87 ("If this [reciprocal equality] were not so, there will be neither exchange nor
association."); WOOD, supra note 67, at 71.
69. See DIG. 50.17.206 (Pomponius, Various Readings 9) (Alan Watson trans., rev. ed.
1998) ("By the law of nature it is fair that no one become richer by the loss and injury of
another.").
70. ARISTOTLE, supra note 35, ch. 6, 1131b4-1132a7, at 83-84.
71. Seeid. ch. 8, 1133a19-1133a25, at87.
72. See id. 1133b8-1133b28, at 88-89.
73. It is important to note that equality in exchange is entirely distinct from the communist
notion of equality of wealth. Commutative justice does not require equalized wealth but that
exchanges between individuals not be unequal. Thus, to use the above example, a shoemaker may
increase wealth by investing more labor in the production of more shoes and exchanging them for
their just value for other items of production or wealth. The shoemaker's overall wealth may
increase due to increased labor, but it is not at the expense of those with whom the shoemaker
transacts; they receive shoes in exchange for equivalent value that they transfer. See I EWART
LEWIS, MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 135 (1954) (quoting JOHN FORTESCUE, De Natura Legis
Naturae, in I THE WORKS OF SIR JOHN FORTESCUE 214-15 (Thomas Fortescue ed., London
1869)). Discussing the origin of private property by commenting on Genesis 3:17-19, Fortescue
explains that the investment in labor (sweat) is a licit and just way to acquire property or wealth:
[T]here was granted to man property in the things which he by his own sweat could
obtain.... For since the bread which man would acquire in sweat would be his own,
and since no one could eat bread without the sweat of his own countenance, every man
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Saint Thomas Aquinas provides one of the most concise statements of the
normative requirement of paying a just price:
Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be
more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all
contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing.
Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured by
the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as stated
in Ethic. V. 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the quantity of the
thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no
longer the equality of justice: and consequently, to sell a thing for more
than its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and
unlawful.74
This simple normative principle-no one should pay more or less than a
thing is worth-raises at least three questions that are necessary to apply the
norm to real exchanges. First, what is something worth? Second, should all
unjust exchanges be corrected? And third, what if the sale occasions a loss
beyond the value of the thing sold to the seller? I will address each question in
turn.
Value is determined by the relation that a thing bears to the satisfaction of a
human need. Therefore, the just price is the common estimation of the
satisfaction of human needs achieved by a particular thing. 6 The common
estimation may or may not be the prevailing market price where market price
means the maximum price which a market will bear. 7 If the market price
corresponds to the general estimation of the value of human need satisfaction,
then the two will be identical. What is significant about common estimation is
'78that it is common. A particular or unique need or desire of a buyer or a
community is not a legitimate factor in determining the just price.79 The fact
who did not sweat was forbidden to eat the bread which another had acquired by his
sweat.... And thus the inheritable ownership of things first broke forth.
Id. (emphasis added) (first alteration in original).
74. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 77, art. 1, at 1513.
75. AQUINAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 2.
76. See NOONAN, supra note 31, at 82-83 (quoting DIG. 35.2.63 (Paul, Lex Julia et Papia
2)).
77. See id. at 85, 87-88.
78. See id. at 88.
79. See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 77, art. 1, at 1514 ("Yet if the
one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other man's property .. the latter
ought not to raise the price, because the advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller,
but to a circumstance affecting the buyer."); see also DIG. 35.2.63 (Paul, Lex Julia et Papia 2)
(Alan Watson trans., rev. ed. 1998) ("Things acquire their value from their general usefulness not
[VOL. 60: 707
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss3/6
ANCIENT PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
that a buyer is starving and without food does not entitle the seller to ask a price
above the common price for such food.
Yet, how does one know the common estimation of value or price? In
Roman law (and later European law rooted in Roman law), there were two
possible methods: the price could be fixed ex ante by the legitimate
governmental authority (as the government does with utility company prices in
modern times) or a good man (ad abitrium boni viri, or what we would call an
expert) could determine it in an expost proceeding.
80
Given the difficulty of determining an exact just price in the absence of a
fixed legal price, when should the law require rectification of an ex ante
incorrect assessment of the just price by contracting parties as determined ex
post by an expert? Saint Thomas Aquinas argued that a sale at any variation
from the just price violates the normative principle of equality in exchange8' but
that the law only requires restitution for knowingly contracting at an unjust
price82 or when the error was without knowledge ("absue fraude") but the
variation from the just price is great ("nimius excessus"). The limitation of a
legal remedy only to cases of intentionally contracting at variance to the just
price or an unintentional great difference does not mean abandonment of theS• 84
more rigorous normative principle. Yet, the recognition that the just price can
from the particular approach or utility of individuals."); id. 9.2.33 (Paul, Plautius 2) (stating the
same concept).
80. See John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of the Just Price, TRANSACTION AM.
PHIL. SOC'Y, July 1959, at 5, 49.
81. See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 77, art. 1, at 1514.
82. Id. (using the word "deceit" (fraus), a term that requires acting with knowledge); see
also Huguccio, Summa, to Causa X, q. 2, c. 2, Hoc ius, Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 15396, fol. 159- ,
quoted in Baldwin, supra note 80, at 56 n.j 18 ("[C]redo tamen nec ecclesiam nec aliquem
hominem ex scientia certa debere plus accipere quam res valeat, presertim si plus offertur per
licitationem."). I translate Huguccio's phrase as: "I believe, nevertheless, neither a church nor any
man, with certain knowledge, ought to accept more than a thing is worth, especially if more is
offered in the bidding."
83. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 77, art. 1, Reply Obj. 1, at 1514
("Accordingly, if without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods for more than their
worth, or the buyer obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as licit, and
provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be too great .... ).
84. Id. ("On the other hand, the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to
virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned unlawful ifthe equality of justice be not
observed in buying and selling .... ). Yet, even under the divine law, which represents the
normative principle embodied in the legal requirement to make restitution, the necessary
imprecision in knowing the exact just price necessitates restitution only if the variation is notable.
See id. ("[H]e who has received more than he ought must make compensation to him that has
suffered loss if the loss be considerable [notabile damnum]. I add this condition, because the just
price ofthings is not fixed with mathematical precision [punctaliter determinatum], but depends on
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85 86change over time85 and can only be estimated necessitates that the force of law
should correct only intentional or notable variations.7 Thus, for example,
Roman law only required restitution to one who sold land for less than one half
of the just price.88 The post-Roman period of Western law saw the gradual
expansion of this remedy to a wider range of transactions than the original
Roman remedy, yet it never corrected all deviations from the just price.
The recognition that the just price could change over time led to the
development of a corollary theory to address situations when a buyer pays for a
purchase at a different time than the creation of the contract (in modern terms, a
credit sale). The theory of venditio sub dubio allowed a seller of goods to charge
more than the current just price if time separated payment from delivery and
there was legitimate doubt as to the just price of the goods at the applicable
future time. Under the theory, a seller must meet two conditions to licitly
charge more than the current just price: there must be a real doubt that the
current just price will remain the same at the time of payment and the agreed
price must not clearly be in excess of a reasonable estimate of the future just
price.9 1 A price clearly in excess of the expected just price constitutes disguised
85. DIG. 35.2.63.2 (Paul, Lex Julia et Papia 2) ("Sometimes place or time brings a variation
[uarietatem] in value; oil will not be equally valued at Rome and in Spain nor given the same
assessment [aestimabitur] in periods of lasting scarcity as when there are crops ...."); see also
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 77, art. 3, Reply Obj. 4, at 1516 (discussing
whether a merchant with knowledge that merchants with a greater supply of the goods sold are
about to arrive in a location needs to disclose the likely downward price effect).
86. See supra note 84.
87. For a discussion of why human law must be in accord with divine law but need not
always strictly enforce the principles of justice in all cases see I ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA pt. 1-11, Q. 96, art. 2, at 1018 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.,
Benzinger Brothers 1947) (1265-74) ("Now human law is framed for a number of human beings,
the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from
which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the
majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which
human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and suchlike.").
88. Code Just. 4.44.2 (Diocletian & Maximian 285); id. 4.44.8 (Diocletian & Maximian
293).
89. See Baldwin, supra note 80, at 22-27.
90. See Gregory IX, Naviganti, in 4 READINGS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION: MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 317 (Julius Kirshner & Karl F. Morrison eds., 1986) ("[S]omeone who pays ten shillings
in order that the equivalent measures of grain, wine, or oil will be handed over to him at some
other time shall not be considered a usurer, even if they then turn out to be worth more, so long as
there is a reasonable doubt whether they were going to be worth more or less at the time of
settlement. By reason of the same doubt even someone is excused who sells cloth, wine, oil, or
other goods so that after a certain amount of time he gets back more for them than they are worth
at the time ofthe sale .... ); see INNOCENT IV, supra note 52, at In Civitate.
91. See Gregory IX, Decretales, V:19:6, In civitate, in Corpus juris canonici, cited in
NOONAN, supra note 31, at 90.
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usury for a loan. 92 Many who considered the issue recognized that although
certain credit sales at higher prices could be licit, the risk of evasion of usury
and just price normative principles was great; they therefore counseled
caution.
The final question related to just price I consider in the current analysis is
whether a seller can charge more due to added cost or expense suffered in the
sale. As with usury, a consensus emerged that a seller need not suffer un-
indemnified loss for actual added expense occasioned by the sale. The seller can
add such compensation to the just price. 94 For example, a merchant could
charge for the cost and expense of storing or transporting the goods.
95
Just price theory holds that normatively nobody should sell something for
more than its common estimation of value plus costs of sale. Under the theory, a
particular need or desire of the buyer for the good is an illegitimate factor in
determining price. The exact just price can vary over time and unless fixed by
law can only be arrived at by estimation. This doubt and variability of price
restricts those cases where the law can correct errors to notable variations or
unreasonable estimates of future prices in credit sales. Finally, adding an
amount to indemnify a seller for costs of sale is a just addition to the price.
V. FINANCING OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE THROUGH THE USURY AND JUST
PRICE LENSES
The system for obtaining housing in America is rooted in the idea of
borrowing. Over the twentieth century, the ideas of home and borrowing
became inseparable. As of 2005, 67% of residential properties in America were
subject to a mortgage-backed loan. 96 By comparison, in 1920 only 39.7% of
92. See id.
93. RAYMOND DE ROOVER, SAN BERNARDINO OF SIENA AND SANT'ANTONINO OF
FLORENCE: THE TWO GREAT THINKERS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 29-30 (1967).
94. See, e.g., AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 77, art. 1, at 1514 ("in
such a case [where the seller suffers a special loss upon selling], the just price will depend not only
on the thing sold, but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to
sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though the price paid be not more than it is worth to
the owner.").
95. See id. art. 4, Reply Obj. 2, at 1517 (explaining that a person can sell a thing for more
than the person paid for it when the just price ofthe good changes in the interim or where the seller
incurs labor or expense, such as "danger... in transferring the thing from one place to another" or
"having it carried by another"); see also Baldwin, supra note 80, at 15, 39-40 (discussing
theologically approved reasons for profiting from the sale of goods).
96. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2005,
at 156 tbl.3-15 (2006), available at http:/www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/h150-05.pdf
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homes in the U.S. had mortgages, 97 and in 1940 only 45.3% were mortgaged.
98
Usury theory asks the question: Is this financial system, where over two thirds
of homeowners utilize a loan to obtain shelter, a just paradigm for people to
acquire necessary shelter? Since borrowers use the loaned funds to obtain a non-
wealth-producing asset, this question needs to be answered in light of the
principles governing consumer loans. The discussion does not consider the
financing of the construction or operation of commercial or agricultural
properties.
Evaluation of the justice of the system depends upon the details of the
transactions. If lenders are charging no more than the return of the money lent
plus compensation for costs, then it is just.9 9 If the lenders are exacting a gain
above such amount merely for the use of money, then it is unjust. 1 It is
common practice for the mortgage lender to charge origination fees to cover the
cost of making the loan. 101 A detailed analysis of mortgage interest rates to
determine the extent to which they exceed any actual unreimbursed costs after
origination is beyond the scope of this Article. Yet I doubt anyone could
seriously argue that the mortgage industry operates as a not-for-profit
enterprise. Assuming lenders charge all of the cash costs of mortgage
transactions (legal and documentary fees) to borrowers and using the federal
funds rate as a quantification of the lenders' cost of funds, 10 2 we are left with the
question of whether the spread over the federal funds rate represents merely a
reimbursement of internal costs of carrying the transaction (e.g., accounting and
monitoring costs). Given an average federal funds rate of 3.44% from 2000 to
2007 03 and an average 30-year, fixed rate home mortgage interest rate of
6.48% 104 (8.48% for subprime at origination 0 5 ), that leaves 3.04% as a charge
97. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MORTGAGES ON HOMES 41 tbl.6
(1923), available at http://www2. census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/00551139no2ch2.pdf
98. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1940, at 23 tbl.20 (1943), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/
documents/36911485vpl ch1.pdf
99. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 32-34, 38 and accompanying text.
101. Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 16, at 32.
102. In fact, using the federal funds rate may overestimate the costs of capital given that
fractional reserve banking allows a bank to lend a multiple of the funds it has on deposit. Banks
can thus spread the cost of funds over multiple transactions.
103. See Federal Reserve Statistical Release - Historical Data,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (locate "Federal funds (effective)" under
"Instruments"; then follow "Annual" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
104. Freddie Mac: Weekly Mortgage Market Surveys, http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/
pmms30.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
105. This figure is extrapolated from the fact that subprime rates at origination (excluding
future increases) are on average 2 percentage points higher than the interest rates on prime rate
mortgages. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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for these costs (5.04% for subprime). On a $100,000 loan, this equals an
average of $3,040 for such costs ($5,040 for subprime) over the first year alone.
Further, a few recent studies indicate that a significant percentage of those
borrowing in the subprime segment of the market are paying fees and interest
rates above those offered by other lenders. A study conducted by a community
interest group of an industry participant, Citibank, found that at least 40% of
those who obtained high interest rate, subprime mortgages would have qualified
for prime rate loans. A Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae estimate, finding that
between 35% and 50% of subprime borrowers could have qualified for lower
rate loans, confirms this analysis. 107 A study conducted for the Wall Street
Journal showed that from 2000 to 2006, 55% of subprime mortgages went to
borrowers with credit scores that would have qualified them for lower cost
mortgages. 0 8 Although these studies do not prove that all borrowers are paying
more than cost compensation, they at least suggest that a significant portion of
them are paying more than other lenders are charging; this strongly suggests the
payment of usury in the scholastic sense of the term.
The just price theory presents an opportunity to consider the mortgage
market from another perspective. Although our culture has become accustomed
to calling the mortgagor of a property the owner, to what extent does one really
"own" a house subject to a mortgage? Ownership is "[t]he bundle of rights
allowing one to use, manage, and enjoy property, including the right to convey
it to others."' 109 Yet, one who has acquired a home subject to a mortgage does
not possess the right to do these things absolutely; the right is contingent upon
repayment of the loan supported by the mortgage plus required fees. If one
doubts the restriction on ownership, consider the result of attempting to convey
the property without discharging the mortgage. The rights of the home owner
can better be described as contingent ownership, or "[o]wnership in which title
is imperfect but is capable of becoming perfect on the fulfillment of some
condition." 0
Economically, a mortgage-financed home purchase is a credit sale of
property by the mortgagee. In essence, the bank purchases the property and then
agrees to resell it to the borrower over time at an increased price (the amount of
the mortgage plus interest). The fact that a lender requires its borrower to pay
some of the purchase price quickly (by only financing 80% or 90% of the price)
106. See Lew Sichelman, Community Group Claims CitiFinancial Still Predatory,
ORIGINATION NEWS, Jan. 2002, at 25.
107. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 730 n.73 (2006).
108. Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A].
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does not alter this re-characterization. Although the bank does not take record
legal ownership in our current legal system, economically it is no different. 
111
The lender is entitled to enforce the sale of the property to the borrower at a
predetermined price that varies depending on the exact time of completion of
the purchase (or, in current legal terms, at maturity or prepayment) regardless of
the real value of the house at the time of repayment. If the borrower does not
pay by the time required, the lender has a right to use the force of law to remove
all indices of ownership from the borrower (i.e., cancel the sale).
Re-characterized in this way, just price law and its corollary of venditio sub
dubio112 can be used to evaluate the normative justice of the standard terms of
such transactions. First, there must be genuine doubt that the current price of the
residential property will be the same at the time of repayment." 3 Second, the
total price (meaning the total amount paid by the borrower to the lender,
including fees, interest, charges, and points) must not be so great as to clearly
exceed a reasonable estimate of the value of the property at the time of payment
plus the costs of entering into the transaction (legal and documentary fees). 114 A
simple example will illustrate the analysis. A agrees to buy a home from B for
$100,000 and obtains from C a 100% mortgage at the following rates, amortized
over the following periods. In each case, C charges a 1% origination fee and
excludes reimbursement of transaction costs, assuming that C only passes
through the actual cash cost and thus receives no net benefit from these
payments.
Table 1. Equivalent Percentage Increase of Total Payments Above
Original Home Price for 6% and 10% Fixed Interest Rates and 15 and 30
Year Amortization Periods.
Annual Total Equivalent Percentage
Fixed Years of Payments to Increase of Total Payments
Interest Amortization P ents Over Original Price of the
Rate Lender Home
6% 30 $216,850 116.85%
6% 15 $152,890 52.89%
10% 30 $316,930 216.93%
10% 15 $194,425 94.43%
111. Such a re-characterization of the legal form of a mortgage into its economic reality is
similar to the re-characterization of certain transactions which in form appear to be leases into a
secured sale. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 9-109(a)(1) (2001).
112. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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The final column in Table 1 shows the rate of increase in the just price of
the property over the life of the payments on the credit sale. 115 The just price
theory then asks whether such percentage increases in the price of the property
are reasonable. These percentages dwarf the historical rate of increase of
housing prices. U.S. home prices increased a total of only 10% from 1975 to
1995.116 From 1995 to 2004, housing prices appreciated at a more rapid annual
rate of 3.6% (still significantly below annual interest rates), or cumulatively
around 40% for the entire 30-year period. 117 Following further rapid
appreciation, the current decline in housing prices seems to have begun a
decrease in prices of 1.3% over the course of 2007.118 Such simple calculations
generally suggest that lenders price some mortgages at a level in excess of what
just price theory would consider just in a case of a credit sale.
VT. CONCLUSION
The scholastic theories of usury and just price present some fundamental
criticisms of the system our country has developed over the past century for the
acquisition of housing. The system assumes that in order to acquire housing
people should transfer a portion of their future wealth to the class of our society
holding excess wealth. Instead of investing this excess wealth in production
of new wealth, firms lend the money out at what appears to be usury so that
Americans can possess a non-wealth-producing asset: a home. Although we
cannot conclude that every mortgage involves a violation of commutative
justice by exceeding the compensation to the lender for costs and an unjust
wealth redistribution, it appears likely that many mortgages do. The principles
of usury theory present a framework for considering the regulation of mortgage
rates. As consumption loans, the charges involved should be measured by their
relation to compensation for cost rather than by their relation to pure profit for
the use of the money.
Just price theory offers an opportunity for thinking about home mortgages
in a new light. Considered as purchases by the lender and a delayed credit sale
to the borrower, just price theory asks if the price (total payments made by
borrower to lender) can be justified. 12 Again, although the details need more
115. This assumes the original $100,000 was the just price at the starting point.
116. Charles Himmelberg, Christopher Mayer & Todd Sinai, Assessing High Housing
Prices: Bubbles, Fundamentals and Misperceptions, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2005, at 67, 67.
117. Id.
118. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., U.S.
HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS: 1ST QUARTER 2008, at 70 tbl.9 (2008), available at
http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/springO8/ushmc q108.pdf
119. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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analysis, this idea presents a normative paradigm of evaluation. Do the amounts
charged bear a reasonable relation to the just prices of residential property over
time?
Even if we have not had time to find all the answers to these questions, I
hope this Article suggests a consistent and coherent theory for asking and
evaluating these questions. Regardless of whether the financial bailout of the
banking system was prudentially necessary to stabilize the larger economy, a
solution that merely saves the financial institutions that engaged in unjust
transactions will not bring a long term solution to our nation's financial
problems. As Saint Thomas Aquinas commented, exchange and commerce are
necessary for a community, but the economy they support can only achieve long
term stability if the individual transactions supporting it are just and
equitable. 121 Importantly, Aquinas further noted that human law does not always
prohibit all that the natural law forbids. 122 Yet we cannot escape the
consequences of transgressing this higher law, which leaves "nothing
unpunished." 123 Unjust exchanges require restitution, not merely financial
bailouts and future regulation. But even the higher law recognizes that there is a
matter of prudence and degree in evaluating the injustice of particular.. ... 124
transactions, and due to the estimation necessary in assessing value and costs,,, • • , • • 125
a "slight addition" does not render the transaction unjust. Thus, with this
caveat in mind, we cannot conclude that all mortgages have transgressed
commutative justice. As did Roman law before us, we need to select a line of
demarcation between slight variation and considerable. Human law then needs
to provide for restitution to those unjustly treated and to restructure the
regulatory system in light of the principles of usury and just price principles.
Only when the method for home acquisition is returned to these historical
principles of justice and just exchanges again dominate will our financial
markets achieve endurable stability.
121. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q. 77, art. 1, Reply Obj. 1, at 1514.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
125. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 34, Q.77, art. 1, Reply Obj. 1, at 1514.
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